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BOOK REVIEW
EXPOSING THE MYTH OF HoMo ECONOMICUS
MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES
IN THE ECONOMY. EDITED BY PAUL J. ZAK.
PRINCETON UNIVIVERSITY PRESS, 2008.
RONALD J. COLOMBO*

The prevalence of the Homo economicus model of humanity has
crowded out considerations of important noneconomic aspects of human nature-most importantly the moral dimension of human
thought and conduct. As a result, our understandingof the present
ills besetting the business world and the market economy is incomplete, and the policy prescriptionsflowing therefrom are often subop-

timal (if not counterproductive).
This Book Review situates Moral Markets within the larger debate
over human naturegenerally, and shows how, through the presentationof
biological evidence and evolutionary theory, Moral Markets repudiates
the Homo economicus model and supports the Aristotelian position
that human beings arefundamentally moral creatures. After demonstrating that free markets cannot thrive in the absence of virtue, Moral Markets concludes thatfree markets must generally be populated by virtuous
actors. This Book Review asks whether another conclusion might be
drawn: that the free markets of today lack a critical mass of virtuous actors, hence the current spate of corporatescandals and economic woes.
INTRODUCTION

Enron. ImClone. Global Crossing. Tyco. WorldCom. Several
prominent commentators have concluded that the scandals
these names have come to represent are not mere market aberrations, but rather symptoms of a deep, systemic problem with
capitalism today.' As this Book Review goes to press, other
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., William J. Bennett, Op-Ed., Capitalism and a moral education, Cm-. TRIB.,
July 28, 2002, § 2, at 9; Editorial, Helluva problem, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at 18;
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names are becoming synonyms for scandal-Samuel Israel,
Marc Dreier, Bernard Madoff, and surely more with them2
leading to a renewed focus on the market's shortcomings.
To understand this problem fully, and to select an appropriate means of treating it, we must first accurately diagnose its
root cause. As I and others have suggested, this cause is essentially moral in nature: "a loss of belief in objective ethical standards," as one commentator summarized it;3 "a mentality ... [of] putting profits ahead of all principle," in the words
of another; 4 and a rejection of the commandment to "love thy
neighbor," according to the former President and CEO of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.5 And a problem that is
fundamentally moral in nature counsels in favor of a solution
that is, at least in part, also moral in nature.
To others, morality does not enter into the equation. Or, even if
it does, morality certainly does not enter into the solution. To
them, the problem is merely one of properly aligning cost and
benefit structures in such a way as to punish wrongdoing more
6
severely, reward appropriate conduct more generously, or both.

John Plender, Morals pay dividends, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at 15; Michael Prowse,
Why plastering over capitalism's cracks won't work, FIN. TIMES, July 13/14, 2002, at II;
William J. McDonough, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
the September 11 Commemorative Service at Trinity Church (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2002/mcdO20911.html.
2. See, e.g., Tina Brown, Did We All Go Mad?, DAILY BEAST, Dec. 15, 2008,

Posthttp://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2008-12-15/did-we-al-go-mad/;
ing of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com
(Dec. 13,2008, 15:40 EST).
3. Prowse, supra note 1.
4. Bennett, supra note 1.
5. McDonough, supra note 1; see also Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraudfrom Economic and Natural Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 147
(2007) (observing that, from a natural law perspective, the research analyst scandal would be viewed as a fundamentally moral problem).
6. An example of this approach would be the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed by
the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush in direct response
to some of the aforementioned scandals (primarily Enron). Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat
745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and elsewhere). Among other things, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires CEOs and CFOs personally to certify the accuracy of their
companies' filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It attaches a penalty
of up to a $1 million fine or ten years imprisonment, or both, in the event of a knowingly false certification, and up to $5 million and twenty years imprisonment in the
event of a willfully false certification. Id. § 1350 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004)).
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Adherents to a law-and-economics perspective, among others,
7
take this approach.
What becomes clear is that, at its core, the dispute over what
ails the modem market economy (and what ought to be done to
address it) turns on our understanding of human nature. 8 And the
prevailing modem understanding (at least within the context of
economic thinking) is that human beings are little more than rational wealth-maximizers. 9 It is assumed that Homo economicus"economic man" -populates the roles of consumer, entrepreneur,
stockholder, employee, director, and officer in our modem economy." Homo economicus "is cold and calculating, worries only
about himself, and pursues whatever course brings him the greatest material advantage.""' Homo economicus is a single-minded,
wealth-maximizing automaton, who does not take into account
"morality, ethics, or other people." 12 Not surprisingly, subscribing
to the Homo economicus model of humankind leads to characterizing problems and framing solutions in economic terms of benefits
13
and costs, incentives and disincentives.
Many have doubted the existence of Homo economicus, challenging whether the evidence of actual human behavior fits the theoretical model.' 4 And, if Homo economicus does indeed exist, some have
argued that he is to blame for what ails contemporary capitalism."i
Into this fray steps Moral Markets: The CriticalRole of Values in
the Economy. 16 Over the course of fifteen powerful essays, Moral
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007).
8. Cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 235 (1993) ("Moral and political philosophy
must begin with a statement about human nature. We may disagree about what is natural, but we cannot escape the fact that we have a nature-that is, a set of traits and predispositions that set limits to what we may do and suggest guides to what we must do.").
9. See Lynn A. Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157, 158 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Basant K. Kapur, Harmonization Between Communitarian Ethics and Market
Economics, 2 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 35, 36-38 (1999).
14. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of the Corporate Directors (Or,
Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (2003). In furtherance of the evolutionary metaphor, one could attack
Homo economicus as a modem-day Piltdown Man hoax. See, e.g., Don Herzog, Liberalism Stumbles in Tennessee, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1898, 1899 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Norman Barry, Ethics, Conventions and Capitalism, in CAPITALISM,
MORALITY AND MARKETS 57, 57-58 (2001).
16. MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9.
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Markets marshals some of the strongest evidence, and lays out
some of the strongest philosophical, evolutionary, and biological
arguments against the existence of Homo economicus. The contributors to Moral Markets compellingly assert that human beings are fundamentally moral by nature and that the free market economy would not function if things were otherwise.
The full range of repercussions that follow is not entirely discemable, but seems difficult to overstate. For, if correct, the conclusions reached in Moral Markets call into question the merits of
economic analysis of the law and suggest that solutions to corporate wrongdoing (and other economic ailments) heavily take into
account the moral dimensions of humankind.1 7 In short, Moral
Markets exposes the myth of Homo economicus.
This Review summarizes and critiques the evidence and arguments set forth in Moral Markets. In doing so, it does not provide fifteen separate analyses of the fifteen separate essays, but
rather reviews the book thematically. This thematic approach is
particularly appropriate given that the essays in Moral Markets
are not completely independent of each other, but rather reference and build upon one another.
Part I of the Review briefly sketches the work that went into
the publication of Moral Markets. This sketch is necessary to
appreciate the volume fully, for Moral Markets is not merely a
collection of related essays, but rather the fruit of a two-year
collaborative project among several distinguished contributors.
The resulting product is therefore much more coherent and
consistent than most multi-authored volumes.
Part II addresses the claim that human beings are fundamentally
moral in nature. To be clear, the assertion here is not that all people
act properly all the time, but rather that the vast majority of people
possess the ability to recognize the difference between conduct
that is good and conduct that is bad. Although not everyone with
this ability elects to do right instead of wrong, the overwhelming
majority of individuals do indeed make this salutary election. Additionally, this Part points out the happy confluence of Aristotle's
conceptualization of human nature and the empirical evidence of
human nature derived from modem science.
17. See also KatJa Rost et al., The CorporateGovernance of Benedictine Abbeys 2 (May
25, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1137090
(asserting that the "narrow [Homo economicusl view of human motivation may
severely limit progress in understanding incentives").
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Part III considers the claim that individual morality is an essential precondition to the free market economy. It is here that
Moral Markets is most vulnerable to criticism. Moral Markets
makes an unjustifiable leap from the theory that individual
morality is a precondition of the free market economy to the
implicit (and sometimes explicit) conclusion that today's free
market actors do in fact behave in morally appropriate ways.
Such a conclusion is by no means unreasonable, but it does not
inevitably follow. An alternative, and quite worrisome conclusion, could also follow: Today's market participants no longer
behave in morally appropriate ways, and thus our free market
economy is living on borrowed time-subsisting on the remnant of essential but vanishing values. Such a theory could,
perhaps, explain the market breakdowns identified in the
opening paragraph of this Review.
An interesting debate that some of the contributors to Moral
Markets address is whether the free market promotes, rather
than undermines, the moral values essential to its existence. At
one extreme, some argue that free markets not only promote
but generate the values and preconditions required for their
existence. 18 Others insist that markets do not create the values
necessary for their existence and are, indeed, inadequate at
moral self-policing. 19 Still others go so far as to argue that free
markets are parasitic and serve to destroy slowly the very values that their existence requires. 2 Part IV addresses Moral Markets's contribution to this debate.
Part V explores the policy implications that flow from the insights and data presented in Moral Markets-some of which are
noted and amplified by the volume's contributors, and some of
which the book does not consider.
The Conclusion suggests that Moral Markets is required reading for anyone interested in behavioral economics and economic
regulation. Even if one disagrees with each and every conclusion
its contributors reach, Moral Markets brings together, in one convenient and accessible volume, the very latest research and
thinking on the fundamental relationship between human nature and the market economy. One would be hard-pressed to
18. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 15, at 57-77.
19. See WILHELM ROPKE, A HUMANE ECONOMY 125 (Elizabeth Henderson

trans., 1960).
20. See Kapur, supra note 13, at 46-47.
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participate in today's broad public discourse if ignorant of the
facts and scholarship assembled in Moral Markets.
I.

MORAL MARKETS: THE PROJECT

Moral Markets is more than simply a book. As explained in its
introduction, the work "is the culmination of more than two
years of research by a transdisciplinary group of scholars." 21 Its
authors met six times over two and a half years, and "[e]ach
chapter evolved through the process of presentation, critique,
and rewriting." 22 The resulting product is not merely a collection of fifteen essays related by a common theme, but rather a
coherent, albeit multi-authored, whole. Editor Paul J. Zak rightfully boasts that the "approach produced a high degree of
cross-fertilization across both individual contributors and
fields," which is vividly underscored by the "extensively crossreference[d]" chapters.23
The authors of Moral Markets include prominent biologists,
anthropologists, economists, and philosophers; professors of
business and law; and a winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences. 24 The project was spearheaded by Paul J.
Neuroeconomics
Zak, the founding director of the Center for
25
Studies at Claremont Graduate University.
Zak and the other contributors shared a preconceived belief
that "values might play an important role in supporting economic exchange," yet "did not know if this was supported by
solid evidence." 26 Indeed, they remained open to the opposite
possibility and wondered whether "markets and market participants might be inherently immoral" and whether "markets devalue human beings and degrade their dignity." 27 They brought
their diverse skills and training to bear upon these questions.
The consensus they reached was consistent with the authors'
professed suspicion that "the commonly held view that the

J.Zak, Introduction to MORAL
22. Id. at xvi.
23. Id.
21. Paul

24.
25.
26.
27.

MARKETS, supra note 9, at xv.

See Contributorsto MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at xxxiii-xli.
See id. at xl.
Zak, supra note 21, at xv.
Id. at xv-xvi.
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economy is dominated by greed and selfishness" is inaccurate. 28
Instead, the group's research and analysis revealed "that most
economic exchange, whether with strangers or known individuals, relies on character values such as honesty, trust, reliability,
29
and fairness."
II.

HOMo MORALIS

The evidence and arguments set forth in Moral Markets
strongly suggest that human beings are inherently moral creatures. Although they usually prefer more wealth to less, moral
considerations constrain this preference. Thus, to use a term
not coined by Moral Markets, one could say that Homo moralis
("moral man"), rather than Homo economicus, ought to be the
model employed when considering the problems and predicaments of humankind.
A long and illustrious chain of philosophers have argued
that human beings are fundamentally moral by nature. 30 What
this means is that certain moral laws apply to human behavior, just as certain physical laws apply to the behavior of all
physical bodies. 31 As Aristotle taught, human action in accord
with these moral laws results in happiness and flourishing;
human action not in accord with these moral laws poses an
obstacle to happiness and flourishing. 32 For this reason, Aristotelian philosophers have oftentimes labeled as "good," "virtuous," or "natural" those actions that comport with the natural moral law, and as "evil," "vice," or "unnatural" those
actions that violate the natural moral law.33 Through the use
of right reason, individuals are ordinarily capable of distinguishing good from evil and naturally gravitate toward that
which is good. 34 That said, as we are all well aware, human
28. Id. at xvi.
29. Id. at xvii.
30. See id. at xii ("Aristotle, Plato, Jesus, Buddha, and Mohammed all recognized that values are the foundation for happiness, and their wisdom has
stood the test of time."); see also ANTHONY J.LISSKA, AQUINAS'S THEORY OF
NATURAL LAW: AN ANALYTIC RECONSTRUCTION 108-09 (1996); WILSON, supra

note 8, at 225.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See LISSKA, supra note 30, at 108.
See id.; see also WILSON, supra note 8, at 244.
See Colombo, supra note 5, at 140-42.
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, Q. 94, art. 2.
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beings do not invariably choose to do good over evil. "To say
that people have a moral sense is not the same thing as saying
that they are innately good." 3 Human beings sometimes err
in their moral reasoning: they sometimes incorrectly identify
as "good" something that is not good.36 Additionally, individuals sometimes consciously elect to override their moral
inclinations, due to lack of self-control. 37 The likelihood of
such error can be increased by certain negative societal and
cultural influences, thus giving rise to a degree of moral disorientation or weakening of the will, or both.38
Not only individual happiness but also the flourishing of
society as a whole has been thought to depend upon habitual
compliance with moral law. 39 This is not surprising when one
considers that most of the traditionally articulated virtues are
social in nature. 40 Consider, for example, the virtues identified
by Aristotle: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence,
proper pride, good temper, modesty, and friendliness; 41 or
Benjamin Franklin: temperance, silence, order, resolution,
frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness,
tranquility, chastity, and humility. 42 Because market exchange
is a form of social interaction, it stands to reason that these

35. WILSON, supra note 8, at 12.

36. See AQUINAS, supra note 34, at I-I, Q. 94, art. 6; see also J.BUDZISZEWSKI,
WRITTEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR NATURAL LAW 71-75 (1997).

37. See Richard Holton & Stephen Shute, Self-Control in the Modern Provocation
Defence, 27 OXFORD J.LEGAL STUD. 49, 53 (2007) ("For Aristotle, the continent person (the enkrates) feels the pull of temptation or anger or whatever, but resists
acting on it as a result of her judgment that such action would not be best; the
incontinent person (the akrates) does not resist.").
38. See WILSON, supra note 8, at 25-26, 218-19; see also Zak, supra note 21, at xx
(opining that in corporate scandals such as Enron, "the particular corporate culture and likely physiologic state of employees conspired to overcome their innate
sense of moral values").
39. See Luigino Bruni, The "Technology of Happiness" and the Tradition of Economic
Science, 26 J.HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 24, 26-27 & n.13 (2004).
Q. 61, art. 5; see also Robert C. Solomon,
40. See AQUINAS, supra note 34, at I-II,
Free Enterprise, Sympathy, and Virtue, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 16, 35
("The central feature of all [Aristotle's] virtues ... is that they aim at solidifying
our social relationships and our aspirations to excellence ....).
41. Paul J. Zak, Values and Value: Moral Economics, in MORAL MARKETS, supra
note 9, at 259, 261.
42. Id.
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virtues play a role in the economic sphere of society as well as
43
in its non-economic spheres.
As Robert Solomon emphasizes in his contribution to Moral
Markets entitled Free Enterprise, Sympathy, and Virtue, Adam
Smith himself believed that virtue played a critical role in the
free market system. 44 Contrary to the usual characterization of
Smith's argument-that the free market's success is driven by
individual pursuit of raw self-interest-Solomon points out
that Smith instead believed that "[o]ther-interest, not selfinterest, is the engine of a healthy free market system." 45 This
fits well within the Aristotelian tradition, as rampant selfinterest has commonly been recognized as "a perversion... of
human nature," 46 whereas empathy and the "desire to please"
others are consistent with human nature. 47 In other words, human beings are naturally other-regarding, and the success of
the free market system is dependent upon this particular aspect
of human nature. 48 Indeed, within the Aristotelian framework,
a successful societal institution- such as the free marketwould have to be grounded upon virtuous human behavior
because happiness and flourishing (success) are only possible
49
when predicated upon virtue.
The essays that immediately follow Solomon's contribution
take into account various advances since the advent of Aristotelian reasoning. These essays attempt to ascertain, via the science of evolution, whether there is evidence to support the
view that human beings are biologically inclined toward virtue-or, more specifically, whether human beings are indeed
other-regarding and truly possess moral virtues such as empathy and fairness. And, in most respects, Aristotle's insights
"precisely anticipate the findings of modem science."5 0

43. See Zak, supra note 21, at xv; see also RAJENDRA S. SISODIA ET AL., FIRMS OF
ENDEARMENT: How WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE 31 (2007).

44. See Solomon, supra note 40, at 17.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 25-26.
48. See id. at 17-18.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
50. WILSON, supra note 8, at 236.
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Robert Frank considers the evolutionary basis for empathy,
trustworthiness, and "moral emotions" in general.51 Although
"[m]oral sentiments often motivate people to incur costs that
they could avoid," he remains open to the possibility that natural selection favors moral individuals because of the societal
benefits that flow from moral behavior.5 2 He posits that certain
moral miscalculations that individuals tend to make today possibly result from our morality evolving in a different environment-namely, prehistoric society-than that in which hu53
mankind finds itself today-namely, modern civilization.
Thus, individuals today are sometimes confronted with quandaries that human morality is ill-equipped to handle instinctively54 Frank adds, however, that human moral intuitions
nevertheless "provide useful guidance more often than not,"
and that the quandaries he speaks of are exceptions to the gen55
eral rule of their helpfulness.
Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd expand upon Frank's evolutionary hypothesis.5 6 They commence their article by noting
Charles Darwin's conclusion that "all human populations have
essentially the same 'mental and moral faculities."'5 7 Like
Smith, Darwin believed that human beings were, among other
things, naturally endowed with empathy and sympathy.,8 This
is necessary because "without the other-regarding virtue of
sympathy, the social life humans enjoy today would not be
possible." 59 As for the tension that Frank observed, between an

51. Robert H. Frank, The Status of Moral Emotions in ConsequentialistMoral Reasoning, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9.

52. Id. at 46-54.
53. See id. at 55-57.
54. See id. An example Frank provides is the much greater willingness of human
beings to kill one another from afar via long-ranged weapons than in close quar-

ters; he speculates that the norm against killing most likely evolved within the
context of face-to-face interactions, and thus the strength of its application outside
of that context is weakened. See id. at 56-57.
55. Id. at 56-57.
56. See Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Free EnterpriseValues,
in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 107.
57. Id. (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX (D. Appleton & Co. 1909) (1874)).

58. See id. at 117.
59. Id.; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and OrganizationalCulture, 51
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 966-67 (2007) ("[Mloral judgments help to promote and reinforce the cooperative behavior necessary for humans to survive and flourish.").
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individual's strategic best interest and those of society generally, Richerson and Boyd present Darwin in his own words,
concluding that natural selection comes out in favor of those
virtues that favor society:
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of
morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over other men of the same tribe,
yet that an increase in the number of well-endowed men and
an advancement in the standard of morality will certainly
give an immense advancement in the standard of morality
to one tribe over another. A tribe including many members
who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves
for the common good, would be victorious over most other
tribes; and this would be natural selection. 60
Frans B.M. de Waal in How Selfish an Animal? 61 and Sarah
Brosnan in Fairnessand Other-RegardingPreferences in Nonhuman
Primates62 offer empirical evidence to support the assertion that
virtue is a product of natural selection. Their essays describe
experiments revealing strong altruistic tendencies, 63 and
strongly negative reactions to inequity, 64 on the part of monkeys and apes across a variety of situations. Brosnan stresses
that the animals' objection to unfairness per se is particularly
revealing because, unlike humans, their reactions "are not constrained by complex cultural phenomena such as religions,
schools, and governments." 61 In humans, these constraints affect experimental responses and, consequently, make it more
difficult to assess raw human nature. 66 The natural conclusion
is that these tendencies are biologically innate to monkeys and
apes.67 If one assumes that human beings and these nonhuman
60. Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 107 (quoting
134-35).

DARWIN,

supra note 57, at

61. Frans B.M. de Waal, How Selfish an Animal? The Case of PrimateCooperation, in
MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 63.
62. Sarah F. Brosnan, Fairness and Other-Regarding Preferences in Nonhuman Primates, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 77.

63. See de Waal, supra note 61, at 75.
64. See Brosnan, supra note 62, at 77-78.
65. Id. at 79.
66. See id.
67. But see id.
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primates are descended from a shared ancestor, then these experiments might 68tell us something about behavioral traits we
have in common.
Rounding out the scientific examination of morality is Paul
Zak's own essay, Values and Value: Moral Economics. 69 Zak's essay begins by observing the phenomenon of anonymous charitable giving and the fact that most marketplace participants
refrain from misconduct, even in circumstances where getting
caught is highly unlikely;70 both strongly suggest that something other than self-interest motivates human behavior. 71 Zak
proceeds to set forth the biological basis of morality, arguing
that "[sleveral brain mechanisms seem to function together as a
moral compass, guiding us on appropriate modes of behavior
in our daily interactions with other humans." 72 Primary among
these mechanisms seems to be the role played by the hormone
oxytocin, which "appears to induce a temporary attachment to
others" within both human and rodent populations, and may
generate the tendencies of fairness and altruism witnessed in
nonhuman primates.73 Although cultural and social influences
morality, some moral values
can undeniably affect human
"appear to be universal" 74 and "difficult to suppress" neurologically. 75 Zak suggests that these values serve as important
'76
biological "constraints on utility maximization.

68. See id. at 78-79.
69. Zak, supra note 41, at 259.
70. Id. at 260-61.
71. See id. At this point, it is helpful to define the terms "self-interest" and
"other-regarding." At a very high level of generality, one could say that all human
action is "self-interested," if by that term we mean that it is undertaken because of
some net benefit it provides to its undertaker. Even the most charitable or altruistic behavior could be deemed self-interested because, in economic terms, the utility gained by engaging in such behavior exceeds the cost of such behavior. Cf.de
Waal, supra note 61, at 74 (pointing out that any behavior can be deemed selfish in
the sense that it "evolved to benefit its performer"). A dividing line could (and
shall) be drawn based upon the primary motivation of the actor: An actor's actions are "self-interested" when he acts primarily (and consciously) for personal
gain; an actor's actions are "other-regarding" when he acts primarily (and consciously) for the benefit of another.
72. Zak, supra note 41, at 266.
73. Id. at 267-69.
74. Id. at 262.
75. Id. at 270-71.
76. Id.
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Moral Markets does an excellent job in pulling together the
most recent scientific data regarding human morality and
nicely ties the data to traditional philosophical arguments regarding the nature of humankind. What emerges is an image of
man not as Homo economicus, but instead as Homo moralis: a
creature with an innate understanding of right versus wrong
and an inclination toward morally appropriate conduct. Although Aristotle reached this conclusion through contemplation of the purpose of individuals within society, 77 and although "a divine, designing power would have good reason as
a matter of mechanism design to put such a capacity into humans, a gift as essential to their eventual well-being as sight
and locomotion,"7 8 Moral Markets supports this conclusion with
empirical evidence. Although a more exhaustive exploration of
the science may have been possible, such an approach would
have transformed Moral Markets into a reference book instead
of the accessible, readable volume that it is.
There are, however, a few important possibilities that Moral
Markets overlooks. With regard to the evolutionary argument,
the book would benefit from a deeper analysis of the tension
between the advantages that morality offers to society as a
whole and the disadvantages that morality arguably places
upon the individual. As Darwin pointed out, it is not difficult
to see why a society with a more moral populace would have a
comparative advantage over a society with a less moral populace. 79 But within any given society-especially within one with
a highly moral populace-a significant free-rider problem presents itself. A selfish, immoral individual could do quite well
for himself in a town of selfless, morally upright neighbors. He
would enjoy all the benefits of such a society without bearing
the costs and sacrifices that come with morally appropriate behavior. 80 It would appear, therefore, that natural selection

77. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
78. Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design, and Fairness, in MORAL

MARKETS, supra note 9, at 228, 239.
79. See supranote 60 and accompanying text.
80. It should be noted that, when referring to the "costs and sacrifices" of moral

behavior, I am speaking within the very specific contexts of economics and evolutionary biology. Outside of those specific contexts, and within the broader realm
of human existence in its totality, I would not, and do not, claim that morality
imposes costs and sacrifices on its practitioners, but rather would assert, with
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would favor such individuals, who would prosper at the expense of others.
Moral Markets does not, however, completely overlook this
subject. Robert Frank's essay addresses it, arguing that natural
selection would indeed favor moral individuals because of the
benefits that societies bestow upon their trustworthy members, 81 but also recognizing that the difficulty of sorting the
trustworthy from the untrustworthy will lead, in equilibrium,
to a population containing both. 82 Ultimately, it is only apparent
morality that society could reward, as society has no means of
exploring the inner recesses of an individual's heart or mind.
This gives rise to both false positives and false negatives, for
there are many individuals who appear to be moral but in fact
are not, and there are also many individuals who do not appear to be moral but in fact are. Although Frank suggests that
there are some observable, involuntary characteristics of morality,83 overall, society's ability to discern individual morality
seems weak at best.
Finally, regardless of humanity's potential evolutionary past,
genetics is certainly not the only thing that makes a human being a human being; culture and environment play a tremendously important role as well. Thus, Brosnan's remark, that by
studying nonhuman primates we can isolate human nature
stripped of "complex cultural phenomena such as religions,
schools, and governments," 84 reveals both the promise and the
pitfalls of such an approach. For, although such a study might
give insight into our biological nature as human beings, the
effect of nurture might be substantially more significant. As
philosophers (and others) have observed, human beings have
an unfortunate tendency to make moral miscalculations and, at
times, disregard what their better judgment would suggest,
runs contrary to their natural inclinaengaging in conduct that
85
tions toward the good.

Aristotle, that morality is the key to true human happiness and flourishing. See
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
81. See Frank, supra note 51, at 50.
82. See id. at 49.
83. See id. at 50.

84. Brosnan, supra note 62, at 79.
85. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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External, environmental crises can also cause human beings
to stray from their better judgments. 86 As Zak discusses, there
are biological explanations for this phenomenon as well:
Oxytocin appears to facilitate a representation of what another is feeling. These mechanisms are automatic and largely
beyond our conscious control. That is not to say that these
mechanisms are not modulated by the external and internal
environment. For example, during episodes of extreme
stress, other-regarding behavior is typically suppressed as
survival of the individual becomes paramount.... This
may be one explanation for the lack of moral behavior by
those at Enron-the enduring stress of "making the numbers" caused them, at some point, to make up the numbers.
This moral violation appears to be modulated when others
nearby are doing the same thing. This explanation is given
for "ordinary" German citizens who tortured and killed
Jews under the Nazi regime-their neighbors were doing
the same thing so it became acceptable.... Social psycholo87
gist James Waller (2002) calls this "moral disengagement."
This, in turn, raises a critically important question: Does the
free market foster, or undermine, humanity's natural moral
impulses? All of our purported biologically based goodness as
human beings amounts to very little if we labor within an
economy that systematically suppresses it. Part IV addresses
this issue, but first it is necessary to examine the claim that the
free market is dependent upon human morality-regardless of
whether the market promotes or dampens that morality.
III.

MORALITY AND THE MARKET

The second major theme of Moral Markets is that individual
morality is necessary for the proper functioning of the free market. As the volume's preface proclaims, "our open, selforganizing economic system ... is effective only because most of
the time most of its participants abide by internally motivated
'positive' values, such as trustworthiness, fairness, and honesty." 8 Most directly propounding this theme are the previously
86. See id.
87. Zak, supra note 41, at 267 (quoting JAMES

WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: How
ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING (2002)).
88. Oliver Goodenough & Monika Gruter Cheney, Preface to MORAL MARKETS,

supra note 9, at xxiii, xiii.
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considered contributions of Robert Solomon, Peter Richerson,
and Robert Boyd, along with an essay by Oliver Goodenough.
Solomon, as previously indicated, reminds us that Adam
Smith was a moral philosopher. 89 Smith shared with Aristotle
the belief that "nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original
aversion to offend his brethren."9" Although human beings certainly possess a substantial desire to pursue their own material
self-interest, this desire is "greatly qualified and restricted" by
this natural endowment of morality. 91 It is upon the basis of
self-interest restrained by and coupled with morality that the
successful free market economy is founded. 92 "Other-interest,
not self-interest, is the engine of a healthy free market system." 93 This should not be surprising, as "[e]xchange is inherently other-regarding-both you and I must benefit if exchange
is to occur."

94

Moreover, as Richerson and Boyd argue, our "sophisticated
systems of cooperation such as businesses" are made possible
only by "evolutionary forces that build cultural systems of morality and convention." 95 Empirical research has shown that
"most economic exchange, whether with strangers or known
individuals, relies on character values such as honesty, trust,
reliability, and fairness."9 6
Without such values, monitoring needs would raise transaction costs and might even make commerce prohibitively expensive.97 After all, "because a policeman does not lurk on every
comer, our economic system cannot be--and is not-maintained
solely by coercive enforcement." 98 Thus, as Goodenough argues,
89. See Solomon, supra note 40, at 17.
90. Id. at 25 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at34.
See id.
Id.
Zak, supra note 21, at xv.

95. Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 114-15 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at
116 ("[T]he moral hidden hand deriving from our tribal social instincts is one
foundation upon which our immensely successful free enterprise systems rest.").
96. Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 88, at xvii; see also Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 118.

97. See Goodenough, supra note 78, at 239.
98. Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 88, at xxiv.
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"[vialues don't just lower transaction costs... ; in many contexts,
values make transactions possible."99
The importance of honesty, trust, and reliability to commercial
exchange is not difficult to grasp. Even with strong and sophisticated laws and enforcement mechanisms governing trade, resort to private litigation rarely appeals to anyone. But fairness, too, is something essential to the free market system
1 More than "just a nice addaccording to Goodenough. '0
on, . . . [f]airness is a value that free enterprise ...must have at
its heart."'' Without fairness, the economy risks both instabil10 2
ity and coercive redistribution.
In sum, Moral Markets echoes and amplifies what many have
asserted for some time: Virtue is most salutary, if not indispensable, to a free market economy. 10 3 Although this assertion may
seem novel to generations reared on law and economics,c4 it
actually restores the understanding of free market economics
0 5
as originally expounded by Adam Smith.
Just because a successful free market relies upon a certain
degree of virtue does not, however, mean that the participants
in our current free market system contain the requisite degree
of virtue. This is where Moral Markets falters. For Moral Markets
leaves its reader with the impression that our existing free
market economy overflows with virtuous actors because free
market economies require virtuous actors.10 6 This reasoning
overlooks the possibilities that our free market system operates
deficiently, or that our free market system, although perhaps
currently successful, lives on borrowed time because the well
of virtue upon which it depends is running dry.

99. Goodenough, supra note 78, at 239.
100. Id. at 246.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 5, at 147-49.
104. Cf. Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 117 ("Some business management
scholars believe that the influence of neoclassical economists with their rationalselfish models and intuitions has crowded out the moral hidden hand in the behavior of management school graduates.").
105. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
106. Cf. Zak, supra note 21, at xxii ("Our collective view is that the characterization of market actors as greedy and selfish is farcical and egregiously needs to be
remedied by the verity of moral markets.").
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Although invoked frequently, the adjective "successful" in
the phrase "successful free market system" is not defined in
Moral Markets. Presumably, a "successful" free market system
107
is one that allocates goods and services well and efficiently.
A good allocation of goods and services would be one that
avoids the twin disasters of surpluses and shortages, by steering goods and services to those who most desire them. Efficiency in allocation would mean maximizing society's production and output given its limited supply of resources. On
both measures, it is undeniable that free market economies
perform better than economies that are not free. 10 8 But another, more difficult question must be asked: Are the free
market economies of the twenty-first century performing as
successfully as they could? In other words, are today's free
market economies suffering from significantly diminished efficiency and significant misallocations? For example, studies
have identified "the apparent decline in the ability to rely on
the honesty of other people (including employees) as a factor
in reduced U.S. productivity growth in the late 1970s." 109 Is
such a phenomenon at work today?
The fall of Rome did not occur overnight, and an argument
could be made that our free market economies, although currently successful, are on their way to becoming "unsuccessful"
because of a decline in the virtue of market participants. Indeed, the seemingly greater and greater need for government
intervention to control vice and limit greed suggests the decreasing ability of our market economies to sustain themselves
as "free." 10 At a certain point, the legal and regulatory regimes
within which our markets operate may become so dense that it
is no longer accurate to speak of our economies as "free market
economies" as that term was previously understood."' Although the contributors to Moral Markets recognize the need for
legal and governmental support of free market economies," 2
107. See, e.g., MICHAEL PARKIN, MACROECONOMICS 536-37 (1990).

108. See, e.g., Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 108 ("[Tloday, the democratic,
free enterprise society, usually with a more or less generous welfare safety net,
has outcompeted all challengers and is spreading rapidly across the globe.").
109. Kapur, supra note 13, at 36-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See supra note 6.
111. Cf. Goodenough, supra note 78, at 239 (observing that the "free enterprise
system" is "dedicated to a relatively low level of governmental involvement").
112. See, e.g., Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 88, at xxiii.
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they do not address whether that need has increased in recent
decades, nor, a fortiori, do they consider the causes and repercussions of such a development.
Some have argued that, regardless of whether it was successful in the past, the free market economy is not working today."3 Of these, many have identified as the culprit a lack of
virtue on the part of market participants. 1 4 Moral Markets inadvertently suggests that these critics may be on to something, for
if market participants today are indeed less virtuous than in the
past, the successful operation of the free market economy
would be in serious jeopardy.
Regardless of whether market participants today lack virtue
compared with years past, the full panoply of causes for such a
phenomenon stretches well beyond the scope of this Review.
That said, one potential cause deserves discussion: whether the
free market economy itself undermines the very virtues upon
which its existence depends.
IV.

THE MARKET: A VIRTUE PRODUCER OR
A VIRTUE CONSUMER?

Wilhelm R6pke, one of the most influential economists of
post-World War II Europe, was a staunch defender of the free
market economy. 115 Nevertheless, he was wary of those who
would ignore the limitations of the free market." 6 One major
limitation, according to Rbpke, was that the free market required a foundation of virtuous participants-a foundation
that the market could neither build nor maintain on its own:
The market, competition and the play of supply and demand do not create these ethical reserves; they presuppose
and consume them. These reserves have to come from outside the market .... Self-discipline, a sense of justice, honesty, fairness, chivalry, moderation, public spirit, respect for
human dignity, firm ethical norms-all of these are things

113. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
115. See generally JOHN ZMIRAK, WILHELM ROPKE: SWISS LOCALIST, GLOBAL
ECONOMIST (2001).

116. See id.
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which people must possess
before they go to the market and
117
compete with each other.
As we have seen, the contributors to Moral Markets agree
with R6pke insofar as he identifies virtue as essential to the
free market's successful operation." 8 Yet, without mentioning
R6pke by name, a number of the contributors part company
with him over the market's ability to foster or maintain the
prerequisite of virtue. Instead, they assert that the free market
supports, if not generates, the virtues and values necessary for
its existence.11 9 Because the market rewards honesty, fairness,
integrity, and other virtues (via an increased volume of busi120
ness), the market inculcates and promotes these virtues.
Additional support comes from the internal development of
private institutions that provide third-party monitoring of virof these institutions further incentivizes
tue, as the existence
12
correct conduct.'
As previously discussed within the context of natural selection, this reasoning fails to consider whether the market rewards true virtue as opposed to merely the appearance of virtue.' 2 Barring the advent of an accurate crystal ball, the market
cannot directly ascertain a participant's moral makeup, but
must instead rely upon external signs of morality-signs that
potentially could be mimicked. Thus, it could very well be the
case that markets do not promote virtue, but rather promote
117. ROPKE, supra note 19, at 125.
118. See supra Part 1II.

119. See Zak, supra note 21, at xvii ("Markets are moral in two senses. Moral behavior is necessary for exchange in moderately regulated markets, for example, to
reduce cheating without exorbitant transactions costs. Market exchange itself can

also lead to an understanding of fair exchange and in this way build social capital
in non-market settings."); see also Carl Bergstrom et al., Building Trust by Wasting
Time, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 142, 142 ("We argue that markets need

not rest upon values that arose before them; instead, markets may create the values
that allow them to function effectively."); William D. Casebeer, The Stories Markets
Tell: Affordances for Ethical Behavior in Free Exchange, in MORAL MARKETS, supra

note 9, at 3, 12 ("Exchange environments afford incentives to develop and maintain moral standards."); David Schwab & Elinor Ostrom, The Vital Role of Norms
and Rules in Maintaining Open Public and Private Economies, in MORAL MARKETS,

supra note 9, at 204, 207 (discussing the advent and role of "trust-enhancing institutions" in market economies).
120. See Bergstrom et al., supra note 119, at 149.
121. See Schwab & Ostrom, supra note 119, at 207 (discussing the advent and
role of "trust-enhancing institutions" in market economies).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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the simulacrum of virtue. 123 Consideration of this possibility
would have improved Moral Markets.
Nevertheless, both Rbpke's work and Moral Markets likely
contain elements of truth. As the market economy is situated
within a broader societal framework, it stands to reason that
the values present in the market would come, or at least derive
in part, from society at large. Similarly, the free market does
appear to reward, to a degree, many of the virtues identified as
such. 124 For even if one can reap many of these same rewards
by merely appearing virtuous, one of the most effective ways
to appear virtuous is to, in fact, behave virtuously. 125
There is, however, a darker proposition that none of the contributors to Moral Markets tackle: that the market economy actually consumes the virtues it relies upon. This argument proceeds
as follows: Businesses in market economies are dependent upon
sales to succeed; marketing and advertising are employed to
increase sales; marketing and advertising encourage greater
consumption; the desire for greater consumption fuels a desire
for greater wealth; and the desire for greater wealth leads to a

123. Some may wonder whether this distinction is relevant; does it really matter
why someone is behaving in a virtuous manner, so long as his conduct comports
with virtuous behavior? It matters for at least three reasons. First, to argue that the
free market promotes virtue is rhetorically quite powerful and serves to place a
halo over the heads of market participants and the market's defenders. For it suggests that the free market best serves not only our economic interests, but broader
social interests as well-a suggestion not lost upon the editor of Moral Markets,
Paul Zak. See Zak, supra note 21, at xvii ("Market exchange itself can also lead to
an understanding of fair exchange and in this way build social capital in nonmarket settings."). Second, someone who is mimicking virtue may decide, at some
point in time, to "cash in" on his virtuous reputation by taking advantage of his
counterparties in one final transaction. Consider the recent example of Bernard
Madoff, who enjoyed a sterling reputation until his arrest. See Jenny Strasburg,
'Dr. Doom' Didn't PredictMadoff Blowup, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1 (quoting
Henry "Dr. Doom" Kaufman on Madoff: "You ask yourself, how could that happen? He was a reputable individual."). An individual who is truly (intrinsically)
virtuous is, by definition, unlikely to do such a thing. Cf. AQUINAS, supra note 34,
at I-II, Q. 55, art. 1 (defining virtue as the "habit" of doing good). Third, to the
extent that we care about individual happiness and flourishing, and to the extent
that we accept Aristotelian philosophy, happiness and flourishing can only be
achieved by living a life of actual, as opposed to misrepresented, virtue; thus it
matters whether the market promotes the former versus the latter. See supra text
accompanying note 32.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
125. Cf. supra note 123.
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materialistic, dollar-driven culture. 126 So, what might start out
as the opening of a shoe shop to fulfill a pre-existing need
(namely, the need for shoes) transforms, over time, into an enterprise that attempts to create illusory needs via marketing and
advertising for heretofore unnecessary goods and services
(hence, for example, the phenomenon of ever-changing styles
to encourage the purchase of additional clothing and accessories before one's existing wardrobe has been worn out). To
profit by fulfilling a neighbor's needs is indeed "otherregarding" behavior (at least in part); to profit by convincing
one's neighbor that he needs an unnecessary item is not otherregarding at all. Add to this the sale and promotion of harmful
goods and services that people most certainly do not need, but
might want or be made to want (for example, cigarettes and
tanning salons), and we have moved even further away from
commercial exchange as an exercise in virtue. So what might
have started as a desire to profit by serving one's neighbor
quickly grows into a desire to profit at the expense of one's
neighbor. 2 7 Thus, as explained by economist Basant Kapur,
market economies appear ultimately to undermine the very
virtues that Moral Markets identifies as prerequisites to the successful functioning of the economy:
[T]here is an inherent long-term contradiction in the capitalist system, namely, the mentality of self-interest that it tends
to engender, or perhaps facilitate, due to growing affluence,
becomes, over time, increasingly pervasive in society, and
eventually undermines the institutional framework that is
necessary for the success of capitalism. 128
Kapur cites to others who have made similar observations:

126. Cf. Patricia Donohue-White, Controversy: Does the Free Market Undermine Culture? A Response to D.Eric Schansberg, 2 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 132, 133 (1999) (arguing that markets give rise to certain virtues as well as "corresponding vices").
127. Some commentators are heralding an "entirely new stage of capitalism" referred to as "capitalism with a conscience." SISODIA, supra note 43, at 30. To them,
twenty-first century society demands, and businesses are recognizing, the need
for "a more human face for capitalism" based on "environmental integrity and the
needs of people rather than on the contrived needs of companies (narrowly defined as maximizing profits)." Id. Although there is some evidence of this, there is
also much evidence to the contrary; only time will tell whether we are truly in
such a "new stage."
128. Kapur, supra note 13, at 46.
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Sociologist Daniel Bell maintains that our society comprises two conflicting sets of values. On the one hand, there
are the values of the Puritan ethic: hard work, thriftiness,
and sobriety, these are the values upon which capitalism
was built. On the other hand, there are the values of hedonism: immediate gratification, personal pleasure, and expressiveness, these are the values of corporate capitalism,
working to undermine the very values that made capitalism a
success.... Sociologist Robert Bellah also blames capital-

ism. It used to be that the Protestant ethic ruled the land,
holding society together. Capitalism, with its "get-ahead"
individualism, destroyed the social fabric by releasing the
individual from the grasp of kinship, community, and inherited status. 12 9
Although the contributors of Moral Markets do not confront
this dilemma, some of them do acknowledge that economics
and business school training tends to diminish other-regarding
behavior. 130 Herbert Gintis and Rakesh Khurama bluntly state
that "current business school teachings socialize students into
an ethic of selfishness and limited accountability." 131 It seems,
therefore, that merely proffering the Homo economicus model
gives rise to its existence; if we teach and believe that individuals are self-interested wealth-maximizers, we become and cre132
ate individuals that are self-interested wealth-maximizers.
And if, as Moral Markets contributor William Casebeer points
out, the "story" of capitalism conjures up images of "selfish
and insensitive robber barons,"' 33 that too will have profound
societal consequences. For Casebeer asserts that "stories" how an individual or society packages an idea-are "foundational to thought." 134 Conceding that some might consider this
theory a "stretch," Casebeer proceeds to point out that there is
129. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
130. E.g., Frank, supra note 51, at 54 ("[E]conomics training-both its duration
and content-affects the likelihood that undergraduate students will defect in
prisoner's dilemma games."); Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 117 ("Some
business management scholars believe that the influence of neoclassical economists with their rational-selfish models and intuitions has crowded out the moral
hidden hand in the behavior of management school graduates.").
131. Herbert Gintis & Rakesh Khurana, CorporateHonesty and Business Education:
A Behavioral Model, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 300-01.
132. See id.

133. Casebeer, supra note 119, at 3.
134. Id. at 6.
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"ample evidence that stories influence our ability to recall
events, motivate people to act, modulate our emotional reactions to events, cue certain heuristics and biases, structure our
problem-solving capabilities, and ultimately, perhaps, even
135
constitute our very identity."
This discussion-namely, how our understandingof the free
market affects our conduct-is removed from the potential role
that free market plays in undermining virtue. Moral Markets
would have benefited from such a discussion.
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Moral Markets does not overlook the implications that flow
from its findings and conclusions. Once one departs from the
Homo economicus model of human behavior, numerous policy
considerations present themselves. These considerations
largely revolve around the use of law and policy "as a means of
reinforcing values which are internally motivated." 136 The better we understand these values (in terms of their substance and
their importance), the more we may improve the public and
137
private "institutions that support markets."
The significance of this understanding is difficult to overestimate. Coercion (economic or otherwise) has serious limitations
in its ability to deter wrongdoing and protect the innocent. A
society that understands the moral dimension of human nature,
however, frees itself from these limitations; such a society has
access to a broader array of tools with which to influence desirable individual behavior.
We should first pause to consider why coercive solutions to
undesirable behavior are so often unsatisfactory. For starters,
most law is reactionary, passed in reaction to some specific
wrongdoing in an effort to prevent a recurrence of such
wrongdoing. 138 Consequently, the reach of such laws is largely
limited to the particular acts of wrongdoing addressed. Moreover, even the most forward-looking legislation cannot sufficiently foresee the myriad ways that an individual might evade
135. Id.
136. Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 88, at xxiii.
137. See id. at xxiii-iv.
138. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and elsewhere).

No. 2]

Exposing the Myth of Homo Economicus

its dictates; because the creativity of fraudsters is seemingly
inexhaustible, we can be sure that someone, somewhere, someday will find a way to circumvent both the letter and the spirit
of any law passed to deter circumscribed misconduct. 139 For
this and other reasons, the use of law to curtail wrongdoingalthough undoubtedly essential-suffers from serious and problematic limitations regarding both efficacy and desirability:
Even in an ideal world with perfectly unbiased decisionmaking processes, legal sanctions can never be made sufficiently precise to deter or condemn all undesirable activity
because we lack perfect information and cannot perfectly define or adjudicate undesirable activity. Trying to eliminate
those imperfections in information and adjudication would
be not only unfeasible and costly but also undesirable in principle because of the harms that perfect surveillance would
impose. Even if we could eliminate imperfect information by
constantly videotaping everyone at zero financial cost, we
probably would not find it worth the harm to privacy and
the resulting deterrence of innovation and desirable sponta140
neous interaction.
For similar reasons, financial incentives and disincentives
based upon a regime of material punishments and rewards
have demonstrated themselves to be limited in their ability to
influence human behavior. 41 Taken together, this explains the
difficulty in relying on solutions proffered from legal, economic, and law and economics perspectives alone.
On the other hand, policy prescriptions based upon an understanding of individual morality offer great promise. As
Goodenough and Cheney note in Moral Markets, "[v]alues139. This is abundantly clear from the spate of corporate scandals that have broken since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (designed to address corporate
fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal, see supra note 6): the market-timing scandal, the late-trading scandal, the research analysts scandal, and the optionsbackdating scandal, in addition to the fraud of unprecedented scale allegedly
committed by Bernard Madoff. See generally, Brown, supra note 2; Nancy Kestenbaum et al., When is Dating Illegal? Stock Options Investigations: Cases and Issues,
B-1599 PLC/CORP 27 (2007) (discussing stock option backdating); Edwin G.
Schallert, Variable Annuities and Enforcement Issues, A-893 PLI/COMM 487 (2007)
(discussing market timing and bid-rigging).
140. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing CorporateProfits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 748 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
141. Cf. Kapur, supra note 13, at 37 (noting that the self-interest model generates
errors when attempting to predict human behavior).
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based approaches, where they work, provide private, internal
institutions that come at a far lower monetary cost than governmentally enforced laws and other externally enforced institutions." 142 Richerson and Boyd echo these sentiments, writing that
"[b]usinesses and other modern organizations are complex cobest when the moral hidden
operative systems that function
143
hand is operating most freely."
Other implications follow as well. As Richerson and Boyd
observe, "attempts to control individual behavior by the use of
power to set up incentives designed to appeal to selfish motives risk 'crowding out"' the "moral hidden hand" of values at
work.1 " In other words, not only are the typical solutions derived from law and economics fundamentally limited for the
reasons set forth above, but, moreover, such solutions could
actually interfere with the natural operation of virtue and morality. Zak provides a stunning and concrete example of thisone that is most counterintuitive to those reared on law and
economics reasoning:
In a recent experiment at two day care centers in Israel, both
with a rule in place that parents must pick up their children
no later than 4:00 PM, one imposed a fine of $3 for each time
the child was picked up late. The other simply depended on
the parents' following the rule with no sanction for failing to
do so. At the center that imposed a fine, parents' mind-set
apparently changed; the fine seemed to remove the implicit
social sanction associated with being late, because now one
just had to pay a penalty. Over a three-week period, the day
care center with the fine saw twice as many parents arriving
late, and the proportion of latecomers remained steady
thereafter .... 145
Zak concluded that "[tihe lesson ... is that oversight and penalties may crowd out the good behaviors that most people,
most of the time, follow." 146 This is not to say that financial
142. Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 88, at xxiv; see also Regan, supra note 59,
at 970-71 (explaining that values-based approaches to ethics trigger an individual's natural moral responses, whereas external strictures do not).
143. Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 118.
144. Id. at 116.
145. Zak, supra note 41, at 265; accord Regan, supra note 59, at 973 (noting how
the presence of extrinsic sanctions can cause an individual to substitute his or her
moral reasoning with cost-benefit calculations).
146. Zak, supra note 41, at 265.
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disincentives (and the threat of other forms of punishment) do
not play a role in the proper ordering of our economy (and our
society as a whole), for they certainly do; "[t]he trick is to get
1 47
the balance right."
In addition to the efficacy of appealing to human values and
the potential for undermining such appeals through economiccoercive disincentives, a third policy implication flows from the
data presented in Moral Markets: society's need to protect and
promote human virtue, as a critical component of our free
48
market economy.
Although, as the contributors to Moral Markets point out,
human values are an innate, evolutionary, biological phenomenon, 149 human beings are a complex mix of both nature
and nurture. 5 0 Our culture, upbringing, and training play an
important role in the development and transmission of our
values. 15' In short, "values can be learned."5 2 This suggests that
values should be taught. In the concluding essay to Moral Markets, titled Corporate Honesty and Business Education, Herbert
Gintis and Rakesh Khurana suggest this very thing. 153 They
suggest that:
[B]usiness schools should develop and teach a professional
code of ethics similar to that promoted in law, education,
science, and medicine; that the staffing of managerial positions be guided by considerations of moral character and
ethical performance; and that a corporate culture based on
character virtues, together with stockholder-managerial relationships predicated in part on reciprocity and mutual
147. Richerson & Boyd, supra note 56, at 116.
148. See supra Part III.
149. See supra Part II.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.

151. See id. As James Q. Wilson eloquently put it:
Mankind's moral sense is not a strong beacon light, radiating outward to
illuminate in sharp outline all that it touches. It is, rather, a small candle
flame, casting vague and multiple shadows, flickering and sputtering in
the strong winds of power and passion, greed and ideology. But brought
close to the heart and cupped in one's hands, it dispels the darkness and

warms the soul.
WILSON, supra note 8, at 251.
152. Zak, supra note 41, at 270; see also SISODIA, supra note 43, at 197-234 (addressing the ability of firms to influence the behavior of their members via the
establishment of a corporate "culture").
153. See Gintis & Khurana, supra note 131.
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regard, could improve both the moral character of business
and the profitability of corporate enterprise.'54
Enhancing the prospects of such proposals' success is that virtue
and morality are already part of humanity's makeup. 155 Thus,
these proposals are not attempting to create something new out
of whole cloth, but rather, more modestly, they are attempting
to
56
draw out and reinforce pre-existing human tendencies.
Of course, the promotion of virtue need not stop with education alone-the law itself can play a role here.1 7 This is not a
possibility that the contributors of Moral Markets examine at
length, although some of them do touch upon it.158
In sum, therefore, in confronting misconduct in the marketplace, we need not limit ourselves to a set of solutions that is
imperfect and incomplete at best. Instead, policymakers can
take into account both the moral promise and the moral shortcomings of modern men and women, affording access to important supplementary solutions to the problems affecting contemporary capitalism and society. And such moral solutions,
predicated upon our knowledge and understanding of human
morality, arguably hold far greater potential, as they could
remedy not only the wrongdoings specifically identified as
problematic, but also future, unrelated wrongdoings. 59 This
strongly suggests that society ought to undertake independent
measures to shore up humanity's moral capital by inculcating
virtue as best and most appropriately it can. Lastly, we ought
to be careful not to undermine virtue by reliance on methods
and solutions that impair its operation.
CONCLUSION

Moral Markets has been published in the wake of several corporate scandals and at the beginning of what appears to be a
major global economic recession. Its timing could not be better.
154. Id. at 301.
155. See id.
156. See id.

157. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993); BUDZISZEWSKI,
supra note 36, at 44-48.
158. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at 173, 173; Stout, supra note 9, at 170.

159. See id.

No. 2]

Exposing the Myth of Homo Economicus

As criticism of the free market economy escalates, those who
would attack the market economy, those who would defend it,
and everyone in between need to understand how markets
really work and how people really act. Moral Markets sheds
new light on these two questions and, in doing so, challenges
much of the conventional wisdom. Given its important subject
matter, its short length, and its superb readability, there are
few good excuses for not reading this book.
Additionally, Moral Markets helps resituate the science of economics where it belongs: within the larger framework of moral
philosophy. People and societies are human beings and cultures
first, consumers and economies second. Moral Markets makes
clear not merely that this is how things should be, but also how
things actually are. Generations of law and economics scholars
have obscured this fact (in the academy, at least), and have given
rise to the myth, if not the subspecies, of Homo economicus. Moral
Markets is the most significant effort taken to date to dispel this
myth. In short, Moral Markets reminds us that our planet is, and
cautions us that it had better remain, populated not by Homo
economicus, but by Homo sapiens.

